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SPECIAL TOPIC ARTICLE
Contractualism and the Death Penalty
HON-LAM LI∗
It is a truism that there are erroneous convictions in criminal trials. Recent legal findings show
that 3.3% to 5% of all convictions in capital rape-murder cases in the U.S. in the 1980s were
erroneous convictions. Given this fact, what normative conclusions can be drawn? First, the
article argues that amoderately revisedversionof Scanlon’s contractualismoffers anattractive
moral vision that is different from utilitarianism or other consequentialist theories, or from
purely deontological theories. It then brings this version of Scanlonian contractualism to
bear on the question of whether the death penalty, life imprisonment, long sentences, or
shorter sentences can be justified, given that there is a non-negligible rate of erroneous
conviction. Contractualism holds that a permissible act must be justifiable to everyone
affected by it. Yet, given the non-negligible rate of erroneous conviction, it is unjustifiable to
mete out the death penalty, because such a punishment is not justifiable to innocent murder
convicts. It is further argued that life imprisonment will probably not be justified (unless
lowering the sentence to a long sentence will drastically increase the murder rate).
However, whether this line of argument could be further extended would depend on the
impact of lowering sentences on communal security.
Keywords: Contractualism, utilitarianism, erroneous convictions, the death
penalty, life imprisonment, deterrence, T. M. Scanlon
No matter how careful courts are, the
possibility of perjured testimony, mistaken
honest testimony, and human error remain all
too real. We have no way of judging how many
innocent persons have been executed, but we
can be certain that there were some.
Thurgood Marshall1
A guilty verdict may be mistaken in two
different senses. A verdict is mistaken in the
first sense if it does not logically follow from the
evidence. In the second sense a verdict is
mistaken, notwithstanding that it may
logically be supported by the evidence, when it
fails to conform with the facts… . To avoid
conviction of the innocent safeguards have to
be created against both kinds of mistakes. By
taking great care we could, in principle,
eliminate errors of reasoning. Several rules of
evidence single out certain types of evidence for
special treatment with a view to minimizing
the risk of such errors. The corroboration and
hearsay rules, for instance, are designed to
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prevent unwarranted reliance on unreliable
testimony. However, no matter what we do we
cannot completely eliminate mistakes of fact.
This is an inescapable feature of inductive
reasoning: inferences can only be reached as a
matter of probability and not as a matter of
certainty.
A. A. S. Zuckerman2
It is a truism that there are erroneous
convictions in criminal trials. Yet the
extent to which they occur and the
reason why they do are not well
known. It is also not clear what nor-
mative conclusions we could reason-
ably draw from the premise that
erroneous convictions happen. This
article focuses on these issues. I shall
argue that, based on the existence of erro-
neous convictions alone, the death
penalty should be banned because
this form of punishment cannot justi-
fiably be meted out to innocent indi-
viduals erroneously convicted as a
result of the fallibility of a criminal
trial, even if we may never find out
who they are.
Recent legal findings show that
3.3% to 5% of all convictions in
capital rape-murder cases from 1982
through 1989 in the United States
were erroneous convictions.3 In
section II (1)–(5), I shall explain why
a certain number of erroneous convic-
tions in criminal cases are inevitable.
The presence of mistaken convictions
supplies a strong ground for finding
capital punishment morally imper-
missible. I shall argue that this
ground can be explicated especially
effectively in terms of a moderately
revised formulation of Scanlon’s
contractualism.4
Contractualism holds that an act is
permissible if and only if it is justifi-
able to everyone affected by it.5 It
does not seem justifiable for the
court to mete out the death penalty
to individuals convicted of capital
crimes by mistake. A contractualist
will disagree with utilitarians who
hold that the death penalty is justifi-
able despite the existence of erro-
neous convictions. The most
thorough contractualist rejection of
this utilitarian position is to reject uti-
litarianism itself. These issues will be
discussed in sections III to VII.
In sections VIII to X, I consider the
normative implication of the perva-
siveness of erroneous convictions. In
section VIII, I argue that a contractu-
alist account would reject the death
penalty as a sentence for murder con-
victs. In section IX, I argue that, based
on contractualism, there is a reason-
ably good argument for rejecting
even life imprisonment for the
offense of murder. I end with the con-
clusion that in order to ascertain the
permitted punishments for murder,
given that there are erroneous convic-
tions, we would need more empirical
data.
Besides this argument from mista-
ken convictions, there are several
other well-known arguments for
banning the death penalty. I shall not
comment on any of them here,
except to note that the contractualist
elaboration of the argument frommis-
takes is an independent argument.
I. State of North Carolina v. Ronald Cotton Jr.
Ronald Cotton, a black man, was
accused of having raped Jennifer
Thompson, a white woman, in the
town of Burlington, North Carolina
in 1984.6 This real-life incident took
place at 3 a.m., when a black man
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quietly broke into Thompson’s apart-
ment and raped her at knifepoint.
During her ordeal, Thompson tried
not to provoke her assailant. Instead,
she concentrated on memorizing the
face of the rapist, in the hope that
she might one day identify him and
bring him to justice. In the dim light
from the street, she studied this face
for half an hour, and tried to remem-
ber its every detail, even his mustache
and scar. Thompson then tricked him
by offering to make him a drink. She
desperately ran out from the back
door, naked. The rapist raped a
second woman later on the same
night.
At the police station, Thompson
sketched out the face of the rapist.
The computer then matched the
sketch with the face of a man called
Ronald Cotton, who had a record of
a minor sexual offense, and (accord-
ing to a criminal detective) had
dated white girls. At the lineup, or
identification parade, Thompson
picked out Cotton. The detective told
her that she had done well.
At the trial, Cotton denied that he
had raped Thompson. He and his
family gave an alibi defense. His
lawyer cross-examined Thompson,
and suggested that she had made a
mistake. She replied: “How dare you
doubt me?” Given that she had
studied her assailant’s face for half
an hour and, above all, had no
reason to lie, her evidence was very
persuasive for the jury. Cotton was
convicted of having raped Thompson
and another woman, Mary Reynolds,
who was believed to have been raped
by the same man.
The real rapist, Bobby Poole, was
later imprisoned for another offense.
Poole told other prison inmates that
he had committed the crime for
which Cotton was convicted. Cotton
appealed on the grounds that Poole
(who looked somewhat like Cotton)
was the real culprit because of what
Poole had told the other inmates.
There was a retrial, and a voir dire7
over whether the evidence provided
by the inmates was admissible or
not. Poole denied that he had raped
Thompson. Thompson also could
not recognize Poole. Consequently,
the purported evidence was ruled
inadmissible, and Cotton was con-
victed of rape at the retrial. Even-
tually, after serving 11 years in
prison, Cotton was freed. There was
a fragment of sperm in the rape kit,
and the sperm’s DNA matched
Poole’s. Poole confessed when the
police arrested him.
II. How Evidence Can Be Unreliable
(1) Eyewitness Evidence
This is one of the many cases built on
eyewitness evidence, which is often
unreliable.8 The police’s computer
matched Thompson’s sketch to the
likeliest-looking individual in its data-
base of persons with a criminal
record. Because Poole had no criminal
record and was therefore not on the
computer’s database, he was not
matched. Instead, the computer
picked Cotton, who had a criminal
record and most closely resembled
the face sketched by Thompson.
When the detective inappropri-
ately said “Well done!” to Thompson
at the lineup, her confidence that she
had picked the right man soared.
Thus she fixed her attention on
Cotton, and consequently she could
Hon-Lam Li
154
not recognize the real culprit, Poole,
when she was asked about Poole at
the retrial.
In this case, Thompson made an
honest mistake. Although the legal
system may do a reasonably good
job in distinguishing those who tell
the truth from those who lie, it does
not do well with a witness who has
made an honest mistake.9 The jury
had no reason to disbelieve
Thompson when she pointed her
finger at Cotton.10
The case of Cotton involved rape
rather than murder. But there have
also been numerous murder cases
that were overturned because of
DNA evidence.11 We should realize,
however, that not every case has
DNA evidence. Many do not.
(2) Mistakes in Criminal Convictions
The jury’s verdict is based on the evi-
dence presented in court. Whether or
not it is a guilty verdict, there is a
risk of its being mistaken. Such a
risk stems from different stages of
the trial, when the judge rules that a
piece of evidence is admissible or
not,12 when the jury decides whether
a piece of evidence is credible or not,
and finally when the jury decides
whether the defendant is guilty or
not. Even if the criminal procedure is
followed flawlessly, a mistaken
verdict can still result because there
is an epistemic gap between the evi-
dence and the verdict.
Just about any trial is a piece of
guesswork. If we are lucky—viz. if
the police, lawyers, and judges are
competent—we get a piece of educated
guesswork, but guesswork neverthe-
less, and there might still be a mista-
ken verdict. Because of the epistemic
gap between the evidence and the
verdict, it is possible in almost every
criminal trial that the verdict is
mistaken.
Do I deny that a jury ever knows
that a defendant is guilty? This would
depend on what we mean by “know.”
If by “know” we mean that one
knows that p if and only if (a) one is jus-
tified to believe that p and (b) it happens
that p, then a jury sometimes knows
that a defendant is guilty of an
offense, but this account is dubitable.13
If, however, by “know” we mean that
one knows that p if and only if one
knows p with certainty,14 then the jury
does not know that any defendant is
guilty of any offense because it cannot
be certain that any defendant has com-
mitted murder.15 Even if the prosecu-
tion has proved beyond any
reasonable doubt that a defendant has
committed an offense, it does not
follow that we know that the defendant
has committed the offense.16
There are ways in which the jury
would be invited to convict if one or
more of the various possibilities
obtain.17 First, the defendant might
be said to be lying if his story is unli-
kely, but just because his story is unli-
kely, it is not necessarily untrue. Some
events that have taken place have
indeed been extremely unlikely.18
Second, even if a defendant lies in
court, it does not follow that he has
committed murder.19
Third, there are risks in a convic-
tion if the only evidence presented
by the prosecution is circumstantial
evidence.20 Even though circumstan-
tial evidence (such as DNA) can be
very strong in casting doubt on a
charge, it is often quite inconclusive
as evidence against the defendant
(see subsection [5] below).
Fourth, recent studies show that
evidence offered by direct witnesses
is often unreliable, not because such
witnesses are dishonest (though they
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sometimes are), but because it is diffi-
cult to determine the identity of a
stranger in a fleeting moment. This
is especially so in cases of cross-
racial identification. Further, because
our memory is fragile, it is easily
influenced by suggestions. In
addition, Gary Wells points out that
if the real culprit is not present at the
lineup, a witness will tend to pick
the “next-best” substitute.21
(3) Trial as Guesswork
A trial is very different from a labora-
tory test, which is generally reliable.
The jury’s conviction depends on an
inference from available evidence to
the conclusion that the defendant is
guilty. There are several types of falli-
bility. First, there is human fallibility
as, for example, when an eyewitness
says that she saw the defendant.
Another type is fallibility of the defen-
dant’s mental state, which I will
discuss in subsection (5). Third, there
is the fallibility of the trial process.
Even if criminal procedure is flaw-
lessly followed, mistaken verdicts
can still result.
(4) Possibility of Mistake in aMurder
Trial
A murder trial is more prone to mis-
carriage of justice than non-capital
cases for the following reasons.22 In
most trials, the victim’s evidence in
court is often crucial.23 Even though
a trial is bound up with guesswork,
the victim’s evidence can throw light
on the motive of the assailant, why it
happened, and how it happened.
When she testifies, her evidence
upon cross-examination by the defen-
dant’s lawyer might show whether
she was telling the truth,
inadvertently making mistakes, or
simply fabricating a story.
In a murder trial, however, the
victim is necessarily unable to give
evidence in court, and hence the valu-
able evidence from the victim is
necessarily unavailable to the jury.
Because this is so, much greater
reliance is usually placed on eyewit-
ness evidence of other witnesses
(which is often unreliable), or “cir-
cumstantial evidence” (which is
often inconclusive), or both.
Because the victim necessarily
cannot give evidence in a murder
trial, the amount of guesswork to be
done by the jury greatly increases. So
do the risks of misjudgment and the
risks of miscarriage of justice. In the
1984 case of State of North Carolina
v. Darryl Eugene Hunt, a 19-year-old
black man, Darryl Hunt, was charged
and subsequently convicted of rape
and murder of a white woman in
Winston-Salem, North Carolina.24
Even though there was scant physical
evidence against him, several eyewit-
nesses for the prosecution gave evi-
dence in court that they saw Hunt on
top of the victim. After serving a
prison term for 19 years, Hunt was
exonerated because his lawyer was
able to trace the DNA evidence to the
real culprit.25 The real culprit was
arrested and confessed. This case
shows that eyewitness evidence could
be completely unreliable. It also shows
that the prosecution can be utterly
unreasonable when it is unwilling to
back down, even after it has been
shown that the DNA of the culprit
does not match the defendant’s.26
(5) “Isn’t there ‘Hard Evidence’ in
Some Cases?”
In 2011, Jared Loughner attempted to
assassinate congresswoman Gabrielle
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Giffords. Many people saw him shoot
Mrs. Giffords and he killed six other
people. Even in this case, however,
there is a reasonable doubt whether
Loughner was really guilty, because
to commit a serious crime, one must
not only have committed the act, but
must also have the necessary mental
capacity.27 It looks as though Lough-
ner might have been rightly judged
insane.28
Apart from the errors of physical
evidence (such as arresting the
wrong person), there is another
type of error that can easily creep
into the deliberation of the verdict.
This is the error regarding the
mental state of the defendant. In
order for anyone to commit a
serious crime, he must have the
necessary mens rea (guilty intention)
– as well as having committed the
actus reus (guilty act). As Charles
Black points out, even if the police
have the right person, questions
arise about the mental state of the
accused. Did he kill in self-defense,
carelessly, recklessly, intentionally,
or in premeditation? Was the killing
an accident? Was he insane,
provoked, or involuntarily intoxi-
cated? Black persuasively argues
that the jury has much room for dis-
cretion and for guessing the correct
answer, and consequently also has
much room for error:
It is very different when one comes to the
question, “Was the action of which the
defendant was found guilty performed in such
a manner as to evidence an ‘abandoned and
malignant heart’?” (This phrase figures
importantly in homicide law.) This question
has the same grammatical form as a clearcut
factual question; actually, through a
considerable part of its range, it is not all clear
what it means. It sets up, in this range, not a
standard but a pseudo-standard. One cannot,
strictly speaking, be mistaken in answering it,
at least within a considerable range, because to
be mistaken is to be on the wrong side of a line,
and there is no real line here. But that, in turn,
means that the “test” may often be no test at
all, but merely an invitation to arbitrariness
and passion, or even to the influence of dark
unconscious factors.29
This is an even easier kind of error,
because the jury is entrusted with
the power to exercise discretion,
which would be very difficult to exer-
cise in a principled way.30
III. Miscarriages of Justice: Erroneous Convictions
Some hard data is available. Of the
people executed in Europe from 1843
to 1943, it was later discovered that
27 cases involved innocent people.31
Hugo Bedau and Michael Radelet
conclude that of 7,000 persons who
were executed in the United States
between 1900 and 1985, 23 were
later found to be innocent of capital
crimes.32 These numbers – 27 and 23
– represent the tip of a large iceberg.
The number of innocent people who
were executed was likely much
greater because only the “lucky
ones” had their convictions over-
turned after their executions.
In a recent study, D. Michael
Risinger shows that in order to
obtain the true percentage of erro-
neous convictions in all serious
cases, we must use not only the
number of erroneous convictions as
the numerator, but more importantly
must also obtain the relevant denomi-
nator.33 Risinger focuses on rape-
murder cases where there was a
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request for DNA evidence, and such
evidence existed. He estimates that
the rate of erroneous conviction in
capital rape-murder cases in the U.S.
between 1982 and 1989 based on
these data was between 3.3% and
5%.34
Contrary to Justice Scalia’s and
Joshua Marquis’s view that the error
rate in felony cases is extremely low
—27 erroneous convictions out of
100,000 convictions35—Risinger
shows that this complacency is
totally unfounded. So what is the nor-
mative implication from the fact that
the rate of erroneous conviction in
capital rape-murder cases in the U.S.
in the 1980s was 3.3% to 5%?
What might proponents of capital
punishment say? They reply in one
of the following ways: first, Assistant
Attorney General Stephen Markman
and his assistant Paul Cassell chal-
lenge the validity of the earlier study
conducted by Bedau and Radelet on
the grounds that it was too subjective
and inconclusive.36 Contrary to
Markman and Cassell’s view,
however, Risinger’s study shows that
3.3% to 5% of all 319 capital rape-
murder convictions (from 1982 to
1989) were erroneous, and that there
is no reason to think that the rate of
error would be very different in
those cases in which no DNA evi-
dence is available.
Second, proponents of capital
punishment argue that even if the
Radelet-Bedau study is valid, capital
punishment has social benefits that
cannot be shown to be unjustified.
Arguing in the same way as Ernest
van den Haag, they stress that the
benefits outweigh the costs.37 By
benefits, they refer especially to the
“incapacitation” of the criminals and
“deterrence,” as well as “just
desert.”38 Further, fully aware of the
possibility of convictions by mistake,
American lawyer and politician Rex
L. Carter holds the opinion that such
occurrences—like the killing of inno-
cent people in a war—are a necessary
evil.39
Surely, a utilitarian would hold
that the sentencing policy causing
the loss of some people’s lives can be
justified on the grounds that other
people may benefit from the policy,
viz. from the additional deterrent
effect of execution over and above
life imprisonment. This view suffers
from two defects. The first one is an
empirical difficulty. Issac Elrich’s
econometric paper notwithstand-
ing,40 empirical studies have shown
that while efficiency in catching the
culprits will considerably increase
the deterrent effect of a punishment,
the additional deterrent effect of
capital punishment over life impri-
sonment cannot be measured. As
Roger Hood observes, “econometric
analyses have not provided evidence
from which it would be prudent to
infer that capital punishment has
any marginally greater deterrent
effect than alternative penalties” and
that “it is futile therefore for such
states to retain capital punishment
on the grounds that it is justified as
a deterrent measure of unique
effectiveness.”41
The second problem is a moral
one. Even if the death penalty had
greater deterrent effect over life
imprisonment, could it be justified?
Some proponents of the death
penalty—such as van den Haag—
argue that utility can be traded
across lives, as long as utility is
maximized. Similarly, on this view,
if the death penalty can save lives
by deterring killers, the convictions
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and execution of innocent people by
mistake can in principle be justified.
I shall show in sections IV–VII
that this view is flawed.
IV. The Normative Implication of Erroneous Convictions:
Utilitarianism v. Contractualism
In order to arrive at a reasonable
position on the relevance of erro-
neous convictions to the kind of
punishment that a court should
mete out, we need the most plaus-
ible ethical theory. To see that utili-
tarianism is not that theory,
consider the question whether it is
permissible for the court to mete
out a “cruel and unusual” punish-
ment (such as dismemberment), pro-
vided that utility will be maximized.
Most of us would reject this form of
punishment, even if utility could be
maximized.42
Another form of punishment is
vicarious punishment. If a criminal
commits a murder, the punishment
would fall not only upon the mur-
derer himself, but also upon his
parents, spouse, children, teachers,
and friends, who had nothing to do
with the crime. A criminal might
not care about his own life, it is
argued, but he might care about
the lives of his close relatives and
friends. Suppose that vicarious pun-
ishment occasions extra deterrent
effect over non-vicarious punish-
ment, and suppose further that this
extra deterrent effect outweighs the
side effect of insecurity feared by
everyone. Even so, most of us
would reject vicarious punishment
as being inherently unfair. Even if a
“cruel and unusual punishment,” or
alternatively a vicarious punishment,
or a (combined) “cruel and unusual”
vicarious punishment, were to
achieve greater deterrent effect and
(as a result) a promotion of utility,43
these forms of punishment are
morally unacceptable. One might
ask for an explanation as to why
this is so. I think the best expla-
nation is a contractualist one.44
Put in terms of justification, con-
tractualism holds that an act, policy,
or law is morally permissible if and
only if it is justifiable to everyone
affected by it.45 However, “cruel
and unusual” punishment, as well
as vicarious punishment, cannot be
justified to those who suffer them.
This is so because, first, the offenders
do not deserve “cruel and unusual”
punishment, since such punishment
would exceed what they deserve. I
have argued elsewhere but can here
only state that the plausible idea of
negative desert (or negative retributi-
vism) would put a cap on what
someone would deserve.46 Second,
the relatives and friends of offenders
simply do not deserve vicarious
punishment at all. Again, this con-
clusion follows from the idea of
negative desert that one who has
not committed any crime does not
deserve to be punished.47 Although
I do not accept the idea of positive
desert (or positive retributivism)—
that an individual who has com-
mitted a crime deserves to be pun-
ished—which is certainly too large
a topic to be taken up here, I
accept the idea of negative desert,
because one can accept the idea of
negative desert without accepting
the idea of positive desert.48
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V. Contractualism: Some Preliminary Thoughts
The best way to understand contrac-
tualism (as expounded by
T. M. Scanlon) is to see it as an
account that seeks to replace utilitar-
ianism.49 Normative utilitarianism (a
first-order theory) entails various
moral implications that are difficult
to accept. For instance, normative uti-
litarianism seems to entail that, faced
with the choice of saving a life and
alleviating people’s headaches, but
not both, we must choose to alleviate
headaches if they are sufficiently
numerous. Most people would find
this conclusion repellent.50 A contrac-
tualist believes that it is a mistake to
maximize utility by aggregating rela-
tively trivial utilities to outweigh a
significant claim, such as a life.
Consider a real-life example. Any
educational establishment in Hong
Kong—and I take it that the same
situation would hold in Western
countries as well—must be accessible
to students with various kinds of dis-
abilities, unless this would cause a
school “unjustifiable hardship.”51
Suppose that in a secondary school,
out of 1,000 students there is one
student with a disability who needs
to use a wheelchair, or alternatively
needs access to psychological counsel-
ing. Accommodating this student
would cost the school resources that
could have been used for upgrading
the school library instead. Suppose
further that not admitting this
student would cause her not to be
enrolled in any school at all. A utilitar-
ian would say that, depending on
how the utilities work out, not admit-
ting such a student could be permiss-
ible, perhaps even mandatory, if
acting according to this decision
would maximize utility. A utilitarian
would care only about the collective
utility, and the plight of the disabled
student might be outweighed by the
gain of other students (viz. a better
library). However, it seems that in
the context of today’s society, not
admitting this student would violate
her right to education.52 If this is the
correct conclusion, what is the justifi-
cation for this view?
A contractualist will think that
ruling such a student out would be
unjustifiable to her, on the grounds
that the brute bad luck of the disabled
student is undeserved and that ethical
considerations would require the
community to redress the situation
as much as is practicable, even if
doing so does not maximize utility.
This approach would provide chil-
dren with disability a level playing
field. It is not clear what a utilitarian
account might be, other than insisting
that the correct decision is sometimes
counter-intuitive, and that rejecting
this student could be the right thing
to do.
Finally, as I argued above, various
kinds of punishment, such as “cruel
and unusual” punishment and vicar-
ious punishment, even if they might
maximize utility (viz. by deterring
crimes), are unacceptable. Again, con-
tractualism can account for the rejec-
tion of these punishments on the
grounds that they would not be justi-
fiable to those who would receive
them. It is, however, not clear what a
utilitarian could plausibly say in
reply.
As should now be obvious, the
differences between utilitarianism
and contractualism can be
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understood as a difference in attitude
toward aggregation. Can relatively
small utilities be aggregated to
outweigh a major claim? Utilitarian-
ism says yes, but contractualism says
no.
VI. Contractualism: The Theory
Despite its many counter-intuitive
implications, normative utilitarianism
still has many supporters. This is so,
Scanlon observes, because of the
intuitive appeal of the foundation of
normative utilitarianism, namely phi-
losophical utilitarianism. Philosophi-
cal utilitarianism is a meta-ethical, or
second-order, thesis about the
subject matter of morality, namely
that the only fundamental moral
facts are facts about individual well-
being. In order to undermine norma-
tive utilitarianism, Scanlon argues,
wemust sap the force of philosophical
utilitarianism by offering a more
plausible alternative meta-ethical
theory. Scanlon’s contractualism pro-
vides such an alternative. As a meta-
ethical theory, it informs us about
what moral wrongness or impermissi-
bility consists in.53 Yet contractualism
also has normative implications.
How is contractualism supposed
to work? Suppose we are interested
in finding out whether an act, A, if
performed under the given circum-
stances is morally permissible or not.
To begin with, we need to find out
whether there exists any principle
which no one could reasonably
reject, and which would disallow A.
If there is a non-rejectable principle
that would disallow A under the
given circumstances, A would be
impermissible.54
In going through various prin-
ciples, how do we know whether a
principle, P, is reasonably rejectable
or not? According to Scanlon, a prin-
ciple is the “general conclusion
about the status of various kinds of
reasons for action.”55 Not all kinds
of reasons have weight. The reasons
must, firstly, be “generic reasons,” or
reasons based on generally available
information of what individuals
would want in certain situations,
characterized in general terms,
rather than detailed and particular
information (which we do not
usually know).56 This is so because
we want to be able to settle questions
of right and wrong in the abstract,
since the particular identity of the
individuals affected is irrelevant.57
Secondly, the generic reasons must
be “personal (generic) reasons,”
which “have to do with the claims
and status of individuals in certain
positions.”58 Impersonal reasons—
such as reasons having to do with
trees, natural wonders, non-human
animals as long as the well-being of
individuals is not affected—do not
concern the claims of individuals
and fall outside the scope of contrac-
tualism, or the realm of “what we
owe to each other.”59
To appeal to individuals’ personal
(generic) reasons, we would need to
know, first, how Pwould affect differ-
ent individuals’ well-being in the
broad sense.60 Scanlon’s way of
understanding well-being, however,
departs from a consequentialist or
welfarist model. For one thing,
“reasons for being concerned with
how one is ‘affected’ by a principle
are not limited to reasons having to
do with one’s welfare,” such as one’s
wanting to be able to “determine by
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one’s choice whether some result is
likely to occur.”61 For another, there
are reasons arising from the harmful
effect caused if a certain type of
action is generally permitted. It
might be that, as in a case of environ-
mental damage, “no individual action
on its own causes a harm to which
anyone could object,” but that such
an action is still impermissible
because of the consequences should
it be generally permitted and per-
formed.62 Second, a different basis
on which individuals could object to
a principle is that it is unfair, unjust,
or rigged.63 Thus, principles should
be set aside if they violate valid con-
siderations of fairness, justice, or
perhaps even desert, as well as other
deontological moral principles.
According to contractualism, an
act, policy, or law is permissible if
and only if it could be justified to
everyone affected by it. Contractual-
ism offers an interpretation as to
what it is to count as a justification.
Treating someone as a mere means is
ipso facto not to justify the act,
policy, or law to her. Contractualism
demands that the justification be
based on grounds that no one could
reasonably reject and that maximiza-
tion of utility cannot (always) be
counted as a justification. Contractu-
alism affirms the importance of conse-
quences but denies that consequences
are the only relevant considerations.
Considerations such as fairness,
justice, and negative desert are also
relevant and important.64
VII. Scanlon v. Harsanyi
For a contractualist, justification is built
upon an understanding of impartiality.
John Harsanyi is a utilitarian who pur-
ports to establish average utilitarian-
ism on the basis of contractualism.65
One important difference between
John Harsanyi, on the one hand, and
T. M. Scanlon, on the other, lies in
their different understandings of the
idea of impartiality. In trying to
obtain normative principles, Harsanyi
needs to adopt some interpretation of
ethical impartiality. He interprets this
condition as the one in which all
parties (behind the veil of ignorance
where they do not know their identity)
would have an equal chance of being
anyone in society.66
As Scanlon points out, the suppo-
sition that we could obtain normative
principles from self-interested parties
trying to maximize their self-interest
under conditions of ignorance
involves a covert transition from the
plausible contractualist idea that we
must be able to justify our acts to
everyone concerned, to the proble-
matic idea that what is justifiable to
everyone concerned is what would
maximize an individual’s self-interest
behind the “veil of ignorance.”67
Why is this supposition problematic?
With reference to Harsanyi, the short
answer is that we cannot justify the
situation to those who lose out in
society (“the losers”) on the grounds
that average utility is high. Scanlon
rightly points out that the fact that
one option promotes higher average
utility than another one does not
settle the matter as to which option
is morally justified.68
A more detailed answer is that the
kind of impartiality required by con-
tractualism must ensure that a course
of action be justified to every individ-
ual affected, regardless of their identity.
But Harsanyi interprets this condition
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as the one under which all parties
would have an equal chance of being
anyone in society. This interpretation,
Scanlon rightly points out, is mistaken.
For the losers can reasonably reject any
principle that purports to justify their
much worse condition by reference to
the fact that others are better off (and
hence average utility is higher).
Scanlon thinks that the problem lies
in the possibility that a much worse
condition suffered by a few can be jus-
tified by the fact that many people
enjoy a somewhat higher level of
well-being. He believes that his con-
tractualism can avoid this problem of
aggregation, and that the origin of the
problem is the supposition discussed
above.69 I am in total agreement with
Scanlon here.
VIII. The Death Penalty
Without Harsanyi’s version of the “veil
of ignorance,” average utilitarianism
would be undermined. Although both
a utilitarian and a contractualist
should consider consequences as
morally significant, only a contractual-
ist can appropriately value fairness,
justice, and negative desert. Even if
“cruel and unusual” punishment and
vicarious punishment could maximize
deterrent effect and (under some cir-
cumstances) utility, a contractualist
would reject these forms of punishment
as impermissible because they are disal-
lowed under the circumstances by the
non-rejectable principle that a criminal
should not receive a sentence in excess
of his desert.
In a similar way, the death penalty
cannot be justified to those who are
executed but are actually innocent.70
For execution consequent upon an
erroneous conviction is disallowed
by the principle that an individual
does not deserve to be convicted and
executed unless he has committed
murder.71 I shall refine this line of
argument in subsection (3) below.
(1) Why Mistakes in Convictions
Might Be Tolerated
When legislators enact a law to crimi-
nalize a particular type of act, they do
so in the knowledge that some inno-
cent persons will be erroneously con-
victed as a result of the fallibility of
the trial process. Even if every legal
procedure were followed flawlessly
according to due process, there
would be no sufficient guarantee
that no innocent persons would be
erroneously convicted, since erro-
neous convictions will occur even if
the best criminal procedure is flaw-
lessly followed.
Even though participants in a
democratic polity agree that all defen-
dants on trial should be dealt with
fairly and according to due process,
they would not agree that no defen-
dant may be convicted unless there
is no doubt whatsoever, because this
would require certainty, and the only
way in which certainty can be
achieved is to convict no one. But
the consequences of convicting no
one would likely undermine law and
order, and consequently cause chaos
in society. The participants agree,
instead, that no defendant may be
convicted unless it is beyond any
reasonable doubt that he or she is
guilty of the offense. Convicting
defendants according to the “beyond
any reasonable doubt” rule,
however, does not mean that there
will be no erroneous convictions.
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Once we allow convictions in
criminal trials—albeit under the
“reasonable doubt” rule—we allow
for the possibility of mistaken convic-
tions. How can we justify or tolerate
the possibility of mistaken convic-
tions? The most plausible answer is
that the possibility of mistaken con-
victions is tolerated because we must
enforce the laws in order to secure
communal safety. Hence, mistaken
convictions are seen as necessary
evils. So far, this reasoning is not
necessarily a utilitarian one. It is com-
patible with contractualism.
However, some utilitarians might
even use this position as a ground
for arguing that this conclusion
could be reached only via a utilitarian
theory of deterrence.72 The utilitarian
move, I think, should be resisted.
Although security and deterrent
effect are important factors for the
court to consider before meting out
certain punishments and for our toler-
ating the existence of mistaken con-
victions, it does not follow that there
exist no limitations on the kind of
punishment to be meted out for a
given offense. Nor does it follow that
any punishment consequent upon
erroneous convictions can be toler-
ated, come what may. For one thing,
even though we value punishment
for its deterrent effect, we do not
thereby become consequentialists or
utilitarians, just as someone who
buys a cellphone for its good conse-
quences does not thereby become a
consequentialist or utilitarian. To be
a consequentialist or a utilitarian, we
must also hold that morality is con-
cerned with nothing else than conse-
quences or utility. Certainly, we can
value both deterrent effect and fair-
ness, because doing so does not
make us consequentialists or utilitar-
ians. In subsection (3) below, I shall
argue that a contractualist should
reject the death penalty. In section
IX, I argue that whether life imprison-
ment should be reduced to a shorter
sentence will depend on the number
of innocent murder convicts affected,
as well as whether reducing life
imprisonment to a shorter sentence
will increase the number of murders.
(2) The Individualist Restriction and
Pairwise Comparison
In order to appreciate how Scanlon’s
contractualism works, we must
deepen our understanding of his
theory. As I pointed out in section
VI, whether an act is justifiable,
Scanlon argues, depends on the
generic personal reasons raised by
those affected by it. Whether a prin-
ciple is justified or rejectable
“depends only on various individ-
uals’ reasons for objecting to that prin-
ciple and alternatives to it,” though
such reasons might involve an indi-
vidual’s well-being, or deontological
considerations, such as fairness, or
both.73 Scanlon holds that “all objec-
tions to a principle must be raised by
individuals,” and that this feature of
admitting only personal reasons
“allows the intuitively compelling
complaints of those who are severely
burdened to be heard, while on the
other side, the sum of the smaller
benefits to others has no justificatory
weight, since there is no individual
who enjoys these benefits and would
have to forgo them if the policy were dis-
allowed.”74 Although what follows
from the observation that “there is
no individual who enjoys these
benefits” is not, I think, entirely
clear, Scanlon thinks that this fact pro-
vides grounds for holding that indi-
viduals’ competing claims have to be
judged against each other by pairwise
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comparison.75 His contractualist fra-
mework places the restriction that an
individual can only put forward com-
plaints or objections that concern only
herself, whether or not such com-
plaints or objections have to do only
with her well-being, or fairness, or
both. Derek Parfit labels this restric-
tion the “Individualist Restriction.”76
The point of comparing individ-
uals’ claims in pairs is to avoid aggre-
gating lesser claims held by a large
number of people, which might over-
ride a weighty claim held by one
person. Thus, if we can save one of
two groups of strangers, but not
both, we are to compare the weight-
iest claim in each group, and deter-
mine the priority of which group to
save based on such a comparison. If
either of these claims is weightier,
then the group to which the weightier
claim belongs will have the priority. In
this event, the number of people in
each group can be ignored.77 Thus,
on Scanlon’s view, a single individ-
ual’s life always outweighs the head-
aches of a huge number of people,
since saving a life is more important
than alleviating a headache and con-
sequently the number of people suf-
fering a headache never becomes
relevant in the determination of pri-
ority. The point of the Individualist
Restriction is to block groups from
aggregating the importance of their
claims.
I myself would reject the Individu-
alist Restriction. Suppose we can save
either one stranger’s life, or alterna-
tively save 200 other strangers from
“near death,” a condition almost as
bad as death. We should save the
200 strangers from near death, but
the Individualist Restriction would
disallow us from doing so.78 Given
this implausible implication, we
should reject the Individualist
Restriction. If we reject the Individu-
alist Restriction, would contractual-
ism collapse into consequentialism
or utilitarianism? The answer is no.
Let me explain.
Scanlon’s contractualism is to a
great extent compatible with virtue
ethics in that both theories rely on
case-based moral reasoning, or casu-
istry. To this extent, both value the
importance of practical wisdom
(phronesis) and reject algorithm.
However, Scanlon’s Individualist
Restriction—like the maximin prin-
ciple and Rawls’s difference principle
—provides an algorithmic formula for
decision-making involving numbers.
Although, like these two principles,
the Individualist Restriction initially
seems plausible, all of them fail to
withstand counter-examples.79 As I
see it, we can accept Scanlonian con-
tractualism without the Individualist
Restriction, and consider cases invol-
ving consequences on a case-by-case
basis. For instance, we can reject any
move to aggregate small utilities for
outweighing a much weightier
claim, and yet accept that a claim
could be outweighed by marginally
less weighty claims that are suffi-
ciently numerous. I will now label
the view that I favor, which rejects
the Individualist Restriction, as
“Scanlonian contractualism” in order
to distinguish it from “Scanlon’s con-
tractualism,” which embraces the
restriction.80
(3) What Follows from Scanlonian
Contractualism?
According to Scanlon’s contractual-
ism, the claim put forward by the
innocent person convicted of murder
by mistake (the “loser”) would out-
weigh the claims held by other
people. Since Scanlon does not take
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into account the number of people
who have a similar claim (e.g., those
who place a lot of weight on deterrent
effect),81 the end result is a pairwise
comparison between (a) the strongest
personal generic reason on the one
side (namely innocent murder con-
victs) to reject the death penalty, and
(b) the strongest personal generic
reason on the other, competing side
(namely those who demand that a
convicted criminal be severely pun-
ished). The personal generic reason
of innocent murder convicts to reject
the death penalty is grounded in the
premise that being convicted of
murder by mistake and then executed
is possibly the worst kind of brute bad
luck one could have. The strongest
personal generic reason of those who
demand murder convicts to be exe-
cuted would likely be based on
general deterrence.82
Although Scanlonian contractual-
ism (without the Individualist Restric-
tion) is different from Scanlon’s
contractualism, both versions agree
on this case. For Scanlonian contractu-
alism, the plight of someone falsely
convicted of murder and then exe-
cuted is much worse than the plight
of any other member in the commu-
nity—even someone who stood to be
murdered.83 More important, if
empirical research on deterrent effect
is any guide, the reduction of the
death penalty to life imprisonment
would involve no loss of security.84
If this is so, no one in the community
could have any personal generic
reason comparable in importance to
that of innocent murder convicts.85
Scanlonian contractualism departs
from Scanlon’s contractualism only
when the competing claims being
compared are sufficiently close, a con-
dition that does not obtain in this case.
So the conclusion reached here is that
the death penalty should be banned
because it is not justified to murder
convicts who are actually innocent.
(4) Is it Ever Justifiable to Convict,
Given Mistakes in Convictions?
Is it ever justifiable to convict, if the
general rate of mistaken conviction
is between 3.3% and 5%?86 It would
be easier to begin our consideration
with convictions for lesser offenses.
Suppose one in every 20 convictions
for careless driving is mistaken.
Suppose further that John is convicted
of careless driving but is actually
innocent because the police arrested
the wrong driver. Let us consider
two questions:
(1) Do we think that John should not
have been punished (say, by way
of a fine)?
(2) Do we think that because there
are erroneous convictions
among careless-driving cases,
the fine should be reduced or
even dispensed with?
Clearly, John should not have been
punished at all (because of negative
retributivism). A similar conclusion
would be reached if the offense were
murder instead of careless driving. I
take it that we do not think that
because of the existence of cases like
John’s, the fine for careless driving
should be dispensed with or even
reduced, because we can assume
that penalties meted out to careless
drivers are an effective way to deter
careless driving and to help ensure
road safety.87 Yet it seems that if the
case under consideration were
murder, the death penalty should
be reduced to a lesser punishment.
Why?
There are several reasons. First,
careless driving is a very minor
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offense, which does not carry with it
any social stigma. Murder is a very
different matter. Second, the death
penalty does not allow any meaning-
ful recourse if relevant evidence sur-
faces after the falsely convicted
offender is executed. The case of care-
less driving is quite different. Third,
there is no clear empirical evidence
to support the view that the death
penalty, compared with life imprison-
ment, would make society safer. On
the contrary, there is evidence that
the deterrent effect of the death
penalty is no greater than that of life
imprisonment.88 Finally, the most
important, but perhaps less obvious,
reason is that the falsely convicted
offender has too much brute bad
luck to bear compared with other
people in the community. In Scanlo-
nian terms, her claim (based on
generic personal reasons) outweighs
the strongest claim of those in the
community.89 Because the punish-
ment is the death penalty, her claim
to not be executed would outweigh
those who demand that a defendant
convicted of murder should be put
to death.90
IX. Life Imprisonment
What if a person convicted of murder
were sentenced to life imprisonment,
instead of facing the death penalty?
How could the problem be resolved?
Obviously, the argument from lack
of recourse would be irrelevant.
Despite this fact, a case could be
made against life imprisonment
because, despite the possibility of
appeals, a number of innocent
persons would still be erroneously
convicted of murder and conse-
quently imprisoned for life. For one
thing, DNA evidence is not available
in all capital cases. In fact, DNA evi-
dence is available in only a small frac-
tion of all capital and non-capital
cases. For another, regarding all
capital cases without DNA evidence,
there is no reason to believe that the
rate of erroneous conviction would
be lower than the rate of 3.3% to 5%
estimated by Risinger for capital
rape-murder cases in the U.S. in the
1980s.91
Can life imprisonment be justi-
fied? A person falsely convicted of
murder has strong personal generic
reasons to reject life imprisonment.
In order to take account of this
person’s claim, we need to weigh
these reasons against the personal
generic reasons put forward by
others (including those who claim
that murder convicts should be sen-
tenced to life in prison or to death)
in the community. Since personal
reasons have to do with individual
well-being (besides fairness), we
should ask how individuals would
be affected. Since I do not accept posi-
tive retributivism, their case must (on
my view) be based on the hypothesis
that a reduction of life imprisonment
to a long sentence (e.g., 25 to 30
years) would have an impact on com-
munal security.92 Those who proffer
such a view would need to hypoth-
esize that, for instance, someone
would be murdered as a result of the
substitution of a long prison sentence
(viz. 25 to 30 years) in place of life
imprisonment.93
I think we can respond as follows.
First, Roger Hood’s empirical research
shows that the effectiveness of the
police in arresting the perpetrators of
crimes has a much greater marginal
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deterrent effect than the marginal
deterrent effect of increasing the sen-
tence from life imprisonment to the
death penalty, because the latter mar-
ginal deterrent effect could not be
measured.94 (Almost certainly, the
effect of increasing welfare would
have a much greater effect on lower-
ing crime than an increase in punish-
ment.95) Given these facts, the
hypothesis that reducing the sentence
from life imprisonment to a long sen-
tence would result in a considerable
rise in the murder rate is, at best,
unreasonably speculative.
Second, even if (say) a reduction of
life-imprisonment to 25 or 30 years
resulted in an increase in murder
rate, we would still need to compare
the personal generic reasons in favor
of the reduction against the personal
generic reasons of those who are
against it. An innocent murder
convict has generic personal reasons
in favor of the reduction on the
grounds that he would be adversely
affected if there were no such
reduction. Those who are against the
reduction would consist of (1) those
who would be murdered had there
been such a reduction (“the potential
victims”), (2) relatives and friends of
a victim of murder who are outraged
that the reduced sentence is unreason-
ably lenient, and (3) people in society
who think that the reduced sentence
is unreasonably lenient.
In considering the case against the
reduction, a utilitarian would argue
that the feelings of the relatives and
friends of the victim, as well as those
of people in society, also count and
might be aggregated to outweigh the
claims in favor of the reduction. A
contractualist would argue that
lesser claims could not in principle
be aggregated to outweigh a major
claim. Moreover, it is plausible that
anyone’s feelings (against the
reduction) should not count indepen-
dently of how reasonable the claim
against the reduction is. So we
should focus on the personal reasons
of an innocent murder convict and
those of a potential victim (who
would be murdered as a result of
such a reduction).
Suppose such a reduction would
cause an extra murder in the commu-
nity. Let us analyze the situation in
two stages:
(A) At the first stage, we would
need to weigh the personal reasons
of the potential victim against the
reduction, on the one hand, and the
personal reasons of an innocent
murder convict in favor of the
reduction on the other. How are we
to compare these two claims or the
personal generic reasons behind
them? To be murdered is a bad
thing, because one’s life is cut short,
or because one’s projects, commit-
ments, plans, and relationships are
terminated without notice. Not all
murders are equally bad, since most
of us would prefer being killed
instantly to being tortured until
dead, in order that pain and suffering
be minimized.
It is probably foolhardy to speak in
general terms, since every case is
unique. Nevertheless, this might be
unavoidable if we are to theorize
and compare these two cases at all.
Imagine that you are convicted of
murder by mistake and sentenced to
life imprisonment. You suffer (1) a
false conviction, and (2) life imprison-
ment. First, although your life is not
cut short, you have lost your
freedom for the rest of your life.96
Your years behind bars without any
possibility of release make you feel
that you are hopelessly rotting away
without anyone’s caring or attention.
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Second, the public blame and
curse you for something you have
not committed. Yet, besides the
legal appeals that you have already
exhausted, there is no further
appeal for you in the sense that no
one would believe that you are
innocent and no one would under-
stand the psychological pain you
suffer. Moreover, what you are suf-
fering is not only psychological and
physical pain, but also an extreme
injustice.
Finally, it is a truism that the three
most common causes of murder have
to do with (1) love and passion, (2)
money and greed, and (3) revenge.
This being the case, at least to some
extent you could do something to
avoid being murdered. For instance,
you should treat an intimate relation-
ship with respect, love, and honesty.
You should be fair to your business
partners. And you should avoid
being provocative. However, as the
cases of Ronald Cotton and Darryl
Hunt show, there is nothing that you
can do to avoid being dragged into a
murder case with which you are not
involved at all. Thus, you feel that
you have no control over your life,
and have no fair and adequate oppor-
tunity to avoid being dragged into
such a case.97
We would need to form a judg-
ment as to whether a murder is
worse than life imprisonment conse-
quent upon a mistaken conviction,
or not. There are three possibilities: a
murder is (1) worse than, (2) compar-
able to, or (3) better than life impri-
sonment consequent upon a
mistaken conviction. While I recog-
nize the risks of generalization, I
believe that life imprisonment
consequent upon a false conviction is
probably comparable to—if not
worse than—a murder.
(B) At the next stage, we need to
factor in how the number matters.
According to Scanlon’s own version
of contractualism, we should make a
pairwise comparison between (1) the
personal generic reasons against the
reduction of sentence, and (2) the per-
sonal generic reasons in favor of the
reduction. On a first approximation,
this comparison translates into weigh-
ing (a) how bad a murder is, and (b)
how bad a life imprisonment conse-
quent upon a false conviction is. Yet,
if we accept Scanlonian contractual-
ism instead, as I argued we should,
we should take into account
numbers if the claims being compared
are comparable. In other words, we
should take into account how redu-
cing the sentence from life imprison-
ment to a lesser sentence (e.g., a long
sentence) would raise the number of
murders, as well as how many inno-
cent murder convicts would be
affected. We should then compare
these two numbers. If the number of
innocent murder convicts is substan-
tially greater than the number of
murders, then life imprisonment
should be reduced to a long sentence
(of 25 to 30 years). If, on the other
hand, the number of murders far
exceeds the number of innocent
murder convicts, then life imprison-
ment should not be reduced to a
long sentence. Unless those who
urge that a long sentence (25 to 30
years) is too light for someone con-
victed of murder have empirical data
to show that a reduction of life impri-
sonment to a long sentence would
cause a considerable rise in murder
cases, such a reduction seems to me
justified.98
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X. Lesser Sentences
Can the punishment for murder be
further reduced? Can a long sentence
of 25 to 30 years be further reduced to
18 years (a moderately long sentence),
or 10 to 15 years (a moderate sen-
tence), 5 to 10 years (a moderately
short sentence), or 3 to 5 years (a
shorter sentence)? As we leave
behind the death penalty, life impri-
sonment, and long sentences, and
turn instead to the consideration of
shorter sentences, the brute bad luck
suffered by an innocent defendant
becomes less and less onerous, but at
the same time the community faces a
greater and greater security risk (if
lower sentences result in more
crime). In the broadest terms, the
burden and risk the community is
facing include (1) the feelings of the
family members and friends of
the victim (who was murdered), (2)
the sense of outrage in the community
at large that the sentence is too light,
and (3) most significantly, the effect
of general deterrence and incapacita-
tion. As I said, I do not think that
the feelings or emotions of the com-
munity and of the victim’s friends
and family members should weigh
much or at all in the equation, since
these feelings should depend on
whether the sentence to be meted
out is reasonable.99 Another reason
against counting these feelings is the
contractualist principle that lesser
personal reasons—even if very
numerous—should not be aggregated
if the contrary personal reasons are
much weightier. After we set aside
these feelings, the effects due to deter-
rence and incapacitation would tend
to diminish as we travel down the
scale of sentences.
There are reasons for thinking that
short sentences would be too light.
First, if murderers were imprisoned
for only three to five years, this
would likely undermine the effects
of deterrence and incapacitation, and
the social order maintained by the
rule of law would likely turn into
chaos.100 Another reason is that it
would be difficult to differentiate the
sentences for murder and those for
armed robbery, rape, burglary, and
theft.101
The right sentence for a given
offense should depend on the effect
of incapacitation and deterrence as
well as the kind of harm that innocent
murder convicts would have to bear,
with a cap on the maximum sentence
(because anything that goes beyond
the maximum would be unjustifi-
able).102 In the case of murder, we
have to weigh and compare the (mar-
ginal) suffering to be borne by a
murder convict who is innocent, and
the (marginal) harm posed to people
if the sentence were reduced. If these
kinds of suffering and harm are of
different orders, then both Scanlon’s
contractualism and Scanlonian con-
tractualism would agree to ignore
the lesser harms. If, however, they
are comparable, then even if the suf-
fering borne by an innocent murder
convict is more onerous, the number
of people to bear the harm should be
taken into account.
For example, if we have to choose
between saving one life or alleviating
numerous headaches, we should save
the life. If, on the other hand, we have
to choose between saving one life, or
preventing 200 near deaths, we
should prevent the near deaths. In
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fact, if we can either save one life, or
cure 10,000 cases of blindness, we
should choose the latter course of
action. This kind of reasoning under
Scanlonian contractualism would
reject the Individualist Restriction,
but is not reduced to aggregational
consequentialism.103
My conclusion can only be impre-
cise. Based on Risinger’s findings that
3.3% to 5% of all convictions in the
U.S. in the 1980s were mistaken, we
should seriously consider the follow-
ing: moderate sentences (10 to 15
years), longer sentences (15 to 20
years), or long sentences (20 to 30
years). To determine the right length
of sentence, we would need data
from empirical studies.104 It would
be foolhardy of me to make a more
precise proposal in the absence of
such data.
XI. Concluding Remarks
The law with respect to careless
driving helps ensure road safety and
its repeal would undermine road
safety. Similarly, the law with respect
to murder helps protect communal
security, and its repeal would make
the community less safe. If someone
falsely convicted of careless driving
cannot reasonably reject the law
imposing fines for the offense even
though he can reasonably reject his
own mistaken conviction, can
someone falsely convicted of murder
reasonably reject the law that
imposes a sentence for murder (even
though he himself can reject his own
mistaken conviction)?105 I think that
no one could reasonably reject the
criminal law and sentencing on
murder, provided that the court
takes appropriate account of the
possibility that an innocent person
could be convicted of murder by
mistake.
Notice that there is no contradic-
tion in holding both (1) that John can
reasonably accept the criminal law
and sentencing laws on murder and
(2) that he can reasonably reject his
own erroneous conviction. As a
reasonable individual, John appreci-
ates the rationale behind these laws.
At the same time, he knows (from
his own first-personal perspective)
that he is innocent in the case in
question. There is therefore an
increase in knowledge shifting from
(1) to (2).106
The fact that there are mistaken
convictions has significant impli-
cations for what is reasonably accep-
table to people in the community.
Scanlon’s Individualist Restriction—
like the maximin principle—would
allow the claim of the worst off (“the
losers”) to prevail over competing
claims. Normally, those who would
fare the worst in criminal cases are
those who are erroneously convicted
of murder, if the mandatory sentence
for murder is the death penalty or
life imprisonment.
Although Scanlon holds that we
should consider the strongest per-
sonal generic reasons of competing
parties only107 and that we can
ignore the numbers of people
holding such claims, even when
their significance is closer or more
comparable or “relevant”108 to each
other, the implications of this view
are highly implausible. That is why
Scanlonian contractualism (without
the Individual Restriction) is more
plausible than Scanlon’s contractual-
ism. Thus, if we consider the
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reduction of life imprisonment for
murder to long sentences (25 to 30
years), moderate sentences (10 to 15
years), and eventually shorter sen-
tences (3 to 5 years), there is no a
priori reason to believe that an inno-
cent murder convict could reasonably
reject any or all of these sentences.109
This is because, on the one hand, we
need to take account of (1) the
increased risk posed to communal
security as a result of decrease in
deterrence and incapacitation, as
well as (2) the consideration that
numbers (of claims) count when the
competing claims are more
comparable in importance, and on
the other hand, (3) what an innocent
person falsely convicted and pun-
ished for murder has to bear. The
extent to which there is an increased
security risk is an empirical question.
We would need to measure how
many more murder cases a shift to
shorter sentences would likely cause,
and then compare this with what a
person falsely convicted for murder
would have to bear, when all other
variables are being held constant.110
Until there is more empirical data,
our conclusion will necessarily be
imprecise.111
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estimate that “the rate of erroneous
conviction of innocent criminal defendants”
sentenced to death is “at least 4.1%.” More-
over, in Exonerations in the United States,
Samuel Gross and Michael Shaffer point
out that 8% of 873 recorded exonerations
between 1989 and 2012 in the United
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4 This article is in various ways a sequel to
my “Contractualism and Punishment.”
5 See Scanlon, “Contractualism and
Justification.”
6 See State of North Carolina v. Ronald
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Cotton, Picking Cotton.
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identification. Of more than 230 cases exon-
erated (as of 2009) as a result of DNA evi-
dence, more than 75% have to do with
unreliable eyewitness evidence. See CBS
News, Eyewitness Testimony.
9 See the interview with psychology pro-
fessor Gary Wells in ibid.
10 Cotton’s alibi evidence was discounted
or even ignored, because this was a case in
which a black man raped a white woman.
Moreover, an accused is expected to lie in
court, and hence an accused’s word—if not
corroborated with other evidence—is
usually disbelieved. This is because an
accused is naturally expected to say that he
is innocent, whether or not he is guilty. For
this reason, an accused used to have no
right in English law to give evidence in a
criminal trial, because it was thought that
his evidence would be worthless. Although
this prohibition was long ago discarded,
the expectation that defendants will lie in
an attempt to escape conviction remains
common.
11 Through DNA testing the Innocence
Project aims to help exonerate those con-
victed of serious crimes by mistake. See
http://www.innocenceproject.org/
12 A mistake could be made regarding a
piece of evidence the admissibility of
which is in question. In State of North Caro-
lina v. Ronald Cotton Jr., Cotton’s purported
evidence that Bobby Poole admitted to
other prison inmates that he had committed
the rape was ruled inadmissible, although
this was in fact the case.
13 See Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief
Knowledge?” A crucial objection to this
account is the Gettier Problem, according
to which justified true belief does not necess-
arily constitute knowledge.
14 See Unger, Ignorance.
15 Very rarely, if ever, does anyone plead
guilty to a murder charge. Gross and
Shaffer, “Rate of False Conviction,” as well
as Roach, “Wrongful Convictions in
Canada” show that in some cases innocent
people plead guilty to criminal charges.
16 See Risinger’s findings (to be discussed
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murder “beyond any reasonable doubt”
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believe that such a rate would be much
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cents Convicted,” 782–8. If this position is
correct—if, say, 3% of all criminal convic-
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we do not know with certainty in any crim-
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where circumstantial evidence suggests
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demeanor in court is suspicious, such as
when he appears to be nervous; where the
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dant murdered the victim; and where the
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witness that the defendant murdered the
victim.
18 See Nagel, View from Nowhere, chap. 11;
Jeffrey, “Statistical Explanation vs. Statistical
Inference”; Salmon, “Statistical Expla-
nation”; and Mellor, “Probable Expla-
nation.” The fact that any one of us was
born at all was unlikely to the extreme.
Nevertheless, it is a fact that we were born.
In any normal copulation, 450 million
sperms compete for an ovum. It is widely
believed that had a different sperm merged
with a given ovum, a different individual
would have emerged. The general point is
that the extremely low probability of the
occurrence of an event, E, does not entail
that the credence of the proposition that E
occurred must be low.
19 For one thing, the police officers were
sometimes found to have liedwith the inten-
tion of strengthening their case. One poss-
ible reason for lying on the defendant’s
part might be to enhance his case. He may
wish to cover up an embarrassing fact; for
example, that he had an affair. He
may also have lied because he would wish
to protect some people, such as the real
culprit.
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20 Circumstantial evidence is the sort of
evidence that points to the defendant as
the culprit by virtue of a number of coinci-
dental factors. For instance, if the defendant
denies that he was with the victim, whereas
certain coincidental factors points toward
the hypothesis that they did meet on or
near the date of murder, suspicion would
be cast on the defendant. However, highly
unlikely events do take place.
21 See CBS News, Eyewitness Testimony.
Our process of picking the right person is
usually by elimination. If the real culprit is
not at the lineup, the witness will usually
pick the “next best” person, another reason
why eyewitnesses can be unreliable.
22 In British law (except in Northern
Ireland), a trial for non-capital crimes does
not require a unanimous verdict in order
to secure a conviction, although this is not
so in federal courts in the United States. It
is usually thought that in British law there
is less chance of miscarriage of justice in a
murder trial, compared with trials for non-
capital crimes. However, I shall argue that,
despite the requirement of unanimity, a
murder trial is actually more prone to mis-
carriage of justice.
23 As the case of Ronald Cotton shows,
even the victim can be mistaken about the
identity of the real culprit. I am not saying
that the victim is infallible; far from it.
24 This case is reported in State v. Hunt,
378 S.E.2d 754 (1989), 324 N.C. 343,
http://law.justia.com/cases/north-
carolina/supreme-court/1989/507a85-0.
html/. Its appeal to the Supreme Court of
North Carolina is reported as State v. Hunt,
457 S.E.2d 276 (1994), 339 N.C. 622, http://
law.justia.com/cases/north-carolina/
supreme-court/1995/17a91-0.html
25 See Sterne and Sundberg, Trials of
Darryl Hunt. The state and federal
Supreme Courts unreasonably refused to
allow Hunt’s appeal, despite DNA evidence
pointing to his innocence.
26 The prosecution in State v. Hunt argued
that even though the DNA in the rape kit
did not match the defendant’s, it was still
possible that the defendant had committed
murder. The Supreme Court of North Caro-
lina as well as the federal Supreme Court
accepted the prosecution’s new position,
and refused to acquit the defendant, until
the defense lawyer was actually able to
track down the real culprit. The fact that
the courts allowed the prosecution to
change its position amounts to requiring
that the defendant prove his innocence
beyond reasonable doubt.
27 Thus, neither a 6-year-old child nor a
mentally insane person could possibly
commit a criminal offense.
28 “Before the attempted assassination of
Reagan, Harvard Law School professor
Alan Dershowitz said in a telephone inter-
view Monday, ‘this would be a clear case
of insanity, because the pre-meditation
would not be seen as undercutting insanity,
it would be part of demonstrating insanity.’
But under the post-Hinckley rules, he said,
‘that’s a very uphill battle.’ ” CBS News,
“Insanity Defense Difficult.” The point I
wish to make is that the possibility that
Loughner was insane could not be ruled
out. In this case, after a process of plea-bar-
gaining, Loughner pleaded guilty to 19
counts and waived his right to the insanity
defense in exchange for the prosecution’s
not seeking the death penalty.
29 Black, Capital Punishment, chap. 2,
esp. 27–8.
30 In Steinbeck’s novella, Of Mice and
Men, Lennie is an autistic man who inadver-
tently killed Curley’s wife. He did not have
the mens rea to commit murder. However,
had he been arrested and tried, he would
likely have been convicted of murder.
31 See Hart, Punishment and Responsibility,
chap. 3.
32 See Bedau and Radelet, “Miscarriages
of Justice,” 36.
33 See Risinger, “Innocents Convicted,”
761–805.
34 Ibid., 768–80. Relying partly on data
provided by the Innocence Project of the
Cardozo Law School, Risinger starts with
the actual known number of 11 capital
rape-murder cases (from 1982 to 1989) in
which the convictions were later found to
be erroneous by virtue of exculpatory
DNA evidence. To be especially safe, he
allows for the possibility that 5% of these
defendants were actually guilty, and uses
10.5 as the numerator. The denominator
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should not be all death penalties imposed
from 1982 to 1989, of which there were
2235. Instead, it should be all capital rape-
murder cases in which there was a request
for DNA evidence and such evidence was
available. This number was estimated to be
319. This yields a percentage of 3.3%. This
is, however, the minimum because there
must have been cases in which post-convic-
tion legal counsel might not have requested
DNA evidence. Risinger estimates the
maximum percentage of erroneous convic-
tions to be 5%. Moreover, relying on a differ-
ent method, Gross et al. arrive at a 4.1% rate
of erroneous conviction in cases of defen-
dants sentenced to death, which they
describe as “conservative.” See their “Rate
of False Conviction.”
35 See Risinger, 761. Justice Antonin
Scalia (concurring in Kansas v. Marsh, June
26, 2006) quoted Oregon district attorney
Joshua Marquis with approval: “[L]et’s
give [Professor Gross et al.] the benefit of
the doubt: let’s assume that he understated
the number of innocents by roughly a
factor of 10, that instead of 340 there were
4,000 people in prison who weren’t involved
in the crime in any way. During that same 15
years, there were more than 15 million
felony convictions across the country. That
would make the error rate .027 percent—
or, to put it another way, a success rate of
99.973 percent (“The Innocent and the
Shammed”). ”
36 See Markman and Cassell, “Protecting
the Innocent,” 122, 126, 157.
37 Ernest van den Haag is a well-known
defender of the death penalty. See Haag,
“Ultimate Punishment.”
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skepticism about positive retributivism else-
where, I shall not try to discuss the argu-
ment that executing murder convicts
would contribute to just desert. See Li,
“Contractualism and Punishment,” sections
6, 8, and 9 as well as notes 86 and 96 therein.
39 See Carter, “Letter to the Editor”:
“Hugo Bedau had best come in out of the
heat. As a defender of capital punishment, I
have no problem in admitting innocent
people can be executed and couldn’t care
less what happens to Gary Graham [who
had admitted to armed robbery but denied
murder]. He should have been executed for
what he confessed to. There is a war going
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thugs like Graham. It is sad that innocent
people get killed in war, but that is the way
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’em 90 days for appeal and then hang ’em
slowly at noon on the courthouse lawn. Just
maybe killers-to-be will get the message,
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A-bomb (cited in Radelet and Bedau, “The
Execution of the Innocent,” 123).”
Even though William Blackstone said
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escape than that one innocent suffer” (Com-
mentaries on the Laws of England, Book 4,
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40 See Ehrlich, “Deterrent Effect of
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41 Hood, “Capital Punishment,” 6. See
also Tonry, “Sentencing in America,” 141–
98; and Nagin, “Deterrence,” 199–263.
42 Utility would be maximized if crim-
inals would be so afraid of execution by dis-
memberment that they would be more
deterred from committing certain crimes
than if a less cruel form of punishment
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of deterrent effect.
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sion, that the gain in deterrent effect out-
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“Can the Maximin Principle,” esp. 599.
67 Scanlon, “Contractualism and Utilitar-
ianism,” 145–6. This supposition is common
to both Harsanyi and Rawls. Insofar as this
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68 Ibid.,143–7. Further, Scanlon’s contrac-
tualism differs from Rawls’ in another two
respects. The contracting parties in Rawls’
Original Position do not have any con-
ception of the good, whereas in Scanlon’s
theory parties contracting hypothetically to
reach an agreement have access to moral
reasons. In addition, whereas Rawls’
theory is designed for use in arriving at prin-
ciples of justice governing the basic struc-
ture, Scanlon’s theory aims at individual
actions and (with modifications) at policies
and laws. On this last point, see Scanlon,
“Individual Morality.”
69 See also Li, “Contractualism and Pun-
ishment,” 178–9.
70 While there are other objections to the
death penalty, the current objection is
grounded in the premise that there are mis-
taken convictions. According to this objec-
tion, the death penalty cannot be justified
to innocent people convicted by mistake.
71 This case is, however, different from
“cruel and unusual” punishment and vicar-
ious punishment in that whereas we know
the identity of those who are punished by
cruel and unusual punishment and vicar-
ious punishment, we may never know the
identity of those who are executed as a
result of erroneous conviction. According
to Risinger, “Innocents Convicted,” 3.3% to
5% of those convicted of capital rape-
murder charges in the U.S. in the 1980s
were actually innocent. Even though we do
not know who these people were, would
the moral badness or wrongness of killing
innocent persons be absolved if we do not
know who they are? The answer is clearly
no. To see this point, consider a bomber
about to drop bombs on the civilians of
enemy country. Would the badness or
wrongness of killing civilians be absolved
if the pilot did not know the identity of
those who were about to be killed? The
answer is no.
72 Some utilitarians might even argue
that because utilitarianism is correct, “cruel
and unusual” punishment and vicarious
punishment can be justified if the empirical
context is such that these punishments
would promote utility under the
circumstances.
73 Scanlon, What We Owe, 229.
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75 See Kamm, Intricate Ethics, 48–77, for
an in-depth discussion of pairwise compari-
son. See also Parfit, “Justifiability to Each
Person.”
76 See Parfit, “Justifiability to Each
Person.”
77 See Scanlon, What We Owe, 238–44.
This is true unless there is a tie, in which
case an extra person on either of the two
sides (because he/she has moral weight)
can break the tie.
78 In conversation, Scanlon agrees that,
everything else being equal, we should
save 200 strangers from near death instead
of one stranger from death.
79 The maximin principle “tells us to rank
alternatives by their worst outcomes: we are
to adopt the alternative the worst outcome
of which is superior to the worst outcomes
of the others” (Rawls, Theory of Justice, 152–
3). The difference principle is to apply to
the basic institutions (“basic structure”) of
society, and permits inequality of goods
(“social primary goods”) only if such
inequality benefits the worst off. See Harsa-
nyi, “Can the Maximin Principle,” for coun-
terarguments against the maximin principle
and the difference principle.
80 I discuss aggregation in detail in chaps.
3 and 4 of Li, “Contractualism and Moral
Problems.”
81 See Li, “Contractualism and Punish-
ment,” 177–80, for a more detailed expo-
sition and discussion of this aspect of
Scanlon’s view.
82 See ibid., 188–98, where I argue that
justifiable principles should be based on
general deterrence (and incapacitation),
as well as negative desert. For the view
that punishment deters crime, see von
Hirsch et al., Criminal Deterrence and
Sentence Severity; endorsed by Robinson
and Darley, “Does Criminal Law
Deter?”, 173.
83 See Hart, Punishment and Responsibility,
chap. 3; and Glover, Causing Death and
Saving Lives, chap. 18. Both Hart and
Glover defend the plausible view that it is
generally much worse to be convicted of
murder by mistake and then executed,
than to be murdered.
84 See Hood, “Capital Punishment,
Deterrence and Crime Rates,” 6. See also
Tonry, “Sentencing in America,” 141–98;
and Nagin, “Deterrence in Twenty-First
Century,” 199–263. Andrew von Hirsch
et al. also support the view that the key
factor for deterrence of punishment to
work is certainty of punishment, and not
severity of punishment.
85 I assume that the family members of
the victim do not have claims comparable
to the claims of murder convicts who are
actually innocent.
86 Three remarks. First, I suppose here
that the general rate of erroneous conviction
is not much lower than 3.3% to 5% (see note
16). Second, themain purpose of this subsec-
tion is to try to understand why it is more
difficult to justify sentences for serious
crimes, than penalties for minor offenses,
even if the risk of erroneously conviction is
the same in both categories. Finally, my
third remark is that the question whether it
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to the Gatecrasher Paradox. In L. Jonathan
Cohen’s original version of the paradox, a
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paid for admission to a rodeo, and that
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there can be no testimony as to whether A
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ematical probability there is a .501 prob-
ability, on the admitted facts, that he did
pay. The mathematicist theory would appar-
ently imply that in such circumstances the
rodeo organizers are entitled to judgement
against A for the admission-money, since
the balance of probability…would lie in
their favour. But it seems manifestly unjust
that A should lose his case when there is
an agreed mathematical probability as high
as .499 that he in fact paid for admission”
(Cohen, Probable and the Provable, 75). We
can modify this example into a criminal
case. Suppose the jury is faced with a crim-
inal trial in which out of 1000 attendees, 30
of them have paid for entry whereas 970
have not. Can the jury justifiably convict
all attendees of an offense for not paying
for entry, if the mathematical probability of
truly convicting any of them is 0.97? Most
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experts would think that the answer is no.
Assuming that they are correct, there
might be an analogous or related (though
different) problem about the justifiability of
convicting any defendant if the mathemat-
ical probability of truly convicting the
guilty is only 0.97 (if the rate of erroneous
conviction is, say, 3%). I mention this
problem in order to set it aside. For discus-
sion on the Gatecrasher Paradox, see Kaye,
“Paradox of the Gatecrasher,” 104; Rhee,
“Probability, Policy, and the Problem,” 289,
and Enoch et al., “Statistical Evidence, Sensi-
tivity,” 207.
87 For the view that traffic laws deter
traffic offenses, see Zaal, “Traffic Law
Enforcement.”
88 See Hood, “Capital Punishment;”
Tonry, “Sentencing in America;” and
Nagin, “Deterrence.” See also von Hirsch
et al. and note 84.
89 See Li, “Contractualism and Punish-
ment,” 178–80.
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the case in which we can either save some-
one’s life, or alleviate numerous headaches,
but not both. Should an agent decide to alle-
viate the headaches, instead of saving the
life, he is doing something wrong because
the person whose life is not saved would
have too much to bear, compared with
each of those suffering a headache. Not to
save her would be morally impermissible.
91 See Risinger, “Innocents Convicted,”
esp. 768–80. Moreover, there is anecdotal
evidence that the rate of mistaken convic-
tion in serious cases is about 5%. According
to Mark Rabil, the defense lawyer of Darryl
Hunt, about 5% of prison inmates serving
long sentences persistently deny that they
were involved in the crimes for which they
have been convicted. Although this evi-
dence is merely anecdotal, it corroborates
with Risinger’s considered judgment that
the rate of erroneous conviction in capital
rape-murder cases in the US from 1982 to
1989 was 3.3 to 5%, as well as the “conserva-
tive” estimation of 4.1% (among those sen-
tenced to death) by Gross et al., “Rate of
False Conviction.”
92 I myself do not accept positive retribu-
tivism apart from condemnation and grati-
tude as deserved. I discuss this in Li,
“Contractualism and Punishment,” 193–5.
My position is roughly similar to Scanlon,
“Giving Desert its Due.” (For my minor dis-
agreement with him, see Li, “Contractual-
ism and Punishment,” 194.) For criticism of
positive retributivism, see Scanlon, What
We Owe, chap. 6; and Hart, Punishment and
Responsibility, postscript, 234–5. I shall set
aside the question of positive desert, since
I do not accept it. Consideration of positive
desert would require another paper. In
section X, I shall consider whether
people’s emotions or feelings should be
given any weight.
93 To see this point, consider the prin-
ciple, P, that an innocent person should not
be mistakenly convicted and punished for
what he does not deserve. On the contractu-
alist model, people belonging to different
interest groups would raise generic personal
reasons in favor of, or against, the principle
P. Those falsely convicted would support P
on the grounds that they would be worse
off. Those who would reject P would be
grounded in the generic personal reason
that accepting P would undermine commu-
nal security. This might be a valid reason if
they could show that the way communal
security would affect each individual of
the community—viz. the harm some indi-
viduals would each bear because of insecur-
ity—is comparable to what an innocent
person has to bear (which is not merely
harm, but also injustice), and if the number
of these individuals would greatly exceed
the number of the innocents convicted.
Those who want to justify life imprisonment
would have to show this. I am willing to
concede, however, that whether or not life
imprisonment is justifiable would, in part,
depend on empirical data.
94 See note 84.
95 See Gilligan, Preventing Violence.
96 I am considering systems where life
imprisonment genuinely means life impri-
sonment, and not those where life imprison-
ment can possibly be remitted because of
parole.
97 See Hart, “Legal Responsibility and
Excuses,” where he argues that legal
excuses are grounded in individuals’ need
to have control over their lives; and
Scanlon, What We Owe, chap. 6, which also
stresses the importance of the fair and
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adequate opportunity for individuals to
avoid committing crimes.
98 If life imprisonment consequent upon
a mistaken conviction is worse than
murder, then Scanlon’s contractualism
would ignore the number of murder cases
caused by such a reduction and conclude
that life imprisonment should be reduced
to a long sentence. Scanlonian contractual-
ism would, however, take into account the
number of murder cases, since a murder
case is comparable to life imprisonment
based on an erroneous conviction.
99 If the sentence is indeed reasonable,
then after the fact of mistaken conviction is
taken into account, the relatives of the
victim and the community should not
strongly object to the sentence meted out.
100 See Li, “Contractualism and Punish-
ment,” 190–3, 197–8. I would be the first
person to admit that this is an empirical
issue, and hence would depend on a par-
ticular context. It is totally conceivable,
though extremely unlikely in our cosmopo-
litan cities, that a short sentence could be
adequate in terms of deterrence or
incapacitation.
101 If a conviction of murder merits three
years of imprisonment, how long a sentence
would be appropriate for the offense of
armed robbery? Suppose armed robbery
carries a two-year sentence. One problem
is that we would be hard-pressed to deter-
mine the difference in gravity between
murder and armed robbery, because the
difference in imprisonment is only one
year. I am indebted to Joe Lau for this point.
102 See Li, “Contractualism and Punish-
ment,” 192–8.
103 I present a more detailed account in
chaps. 3 and 4 of Li, “Contractualism and
Moral Problems.”
104 Insofar as different peoples respond
differently to the same punishment in
terms of deterrence, it is not inappropriate
that the same offense may call for different
punishments in different societies, if, but
only if, all punishments are subject to the
requirement of negative desert. On the
idea of negative desert, see Li, “Contractual-
ism and Punishment,” 192–8.
105 The topic of conviction—given that
Risinger’s study has inferred a rate of 3.3
to 5% of erroneous conviction in rape-
murder cases in the U.S. in the 1980s, from
which we can extrapolate most likely a
non-negligible general rate of erroneous
conviction, while we should also consider
the possible relevance of the Gatecrashers
Paradox (see note 86)—is a large one and
has to be set aside.
106 To use an analogy, the probability
that a occurs, P(a), is (usually) different
from the conditional probability that a
occurs, given that b has occurred, P(a|b).
107 See Scanlon, What We Owe, 232–4.
This position does not hold true in the case
of a tie, in which case numbers could serve
as a tie-breaker.
108 See ibid., 239–40.
109 To clarify, what I mean is that he
could not reasonably reject all of these pun-
ishments for the offense of murder, given
that some murder convicts will be innocent.
He could, of course, reasonably reject his
own mistaken conviction—and hence any
punishment consequent upon his convic-
tion—in his own case.
110 How to achieve this is a question for
statisticians and social scientists. Whether
or not this is possible, I am hopeful. A statis-
tician can try to hold various variables con-
stant, when he/she attempts to study the
effect of lowering the penalty.
111 After drafting an earlier version of
this article, I came across Corey Brettschnei-
der’s article “The Rights of the Guilty: Pun-
ishment and Political Legitimacy.”
Grounded in the contractualism of Rawls
and Scanlon, Brettschneider is concerned
mostly with discrediting Hobbesian con-
tractualism. His argument against the
death penalty is completely different from
mine.
Bibliography
Bedau, Hugo Adam, and Michael L. Radelet.
“Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially
Capital Cases.” Stanford Law Review 40, no.
1 (1987): 21–179.
Hon-Lam Li
180
Black Jr., Charles L. Capital Punishment: The
Inevitability of Caprice and Mistake, 2nd ed.
New York: Norton, 1981.
Blackstone, William. Commentaries on the Laws of
England, 1765. Edited by Ruth Paley.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.
Brettschneider, Corey. “The Rights of the Guilty:
Punishment and Political Legitimacy.”
Political Theory 35, no. 2 (2007): 175–99.
Carter, Rex L. 1994. “Letter to the Editor.”Houston
Post, Nov. 13.
CBS News. 2009. Eyewitness Testimony. Part 2.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GtelV9
lmzQc
CBS News. 2011. “Insanity Defense Difficult for
Jared Loughner.” January 10. http://www.
cbsnews.com/news/insanity-defense-difficu
lt-for-jared-loughner/
Cohen, L. Jonathan. The Probable and the Provable.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
Ehrlich, Isaac. “The Deterrent Effect of Capital
Punishment: A Question of Life and
Death.” American Economic Review 65, no. 3
(1975): 397–417.
Enoch, David, Levi Spectre, and Talia
Fisher. “Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity,
and the Legal Value of Knowledge.”
Philosophy & Public Affairs 40, no. 3 (2012):
197–224.
Franklin, Benjamin. “Letter to Benjamin Vaughan.
March 14, 1785.” In The Writings of Benjamin
Franklin, vol. 9, edited by Albert H. Smyth,
293. New York: Macmillan, 1906.
Furman v. Georgia. 408 U.S. 238, 367–68 (1972)
(Marshall, J., concurring). http://documents.
routledge-interactive.s3.amazonaws.com/
9780415506434/document9.pdf
Gettier, Edmund L. “Is Justified True
Belief Knowledge?” Analysis 23, no. 6
(1963): 121–3.
Gilligan, James. Preventing Violence. New York:
Thames & Hudson, 2001.
Glover, Jonathan. Causing Death and Saving Lives.
London: Penguin Books, 1977.
Gross, Samuel R., Barbara O’Brien, Chen Hu, and
Edward Kennedy. “Rate of False Conviction
of Criminal Defendants Who Are Sentenced
to Death.” Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences of the United States of America 111,
no. 20 (May 20, 2014), 7230–5.
Gross, Samuel, and Michael Shaffer. Exonerations
in the United States, 1989–2012: Report by the
National Registry of Exonerations. June 22,
2012. http://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Documents/exonerations_us_
1989_2012_full_report.pdf
Haag, Ernest van den. “The Ultimate Punishment:
A Defense.” Harvard Law Review 99, no. 7
(May 1986), 1662–7.
Harsanyi, John. “Can theMaximin Principle Serve
as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John
Rawls’s Theory.” American Political Science
Review 69, no. 2 (1975): 594–606.
Harsanyi, John. “Cardinal Utility in Welfare
Economics and in the Theory of Risk-
taking.” Journal of Political Economy 61, no. 5
(1953): 434–5.
Harsanyi, John. “CardinalWelfare, Individualistic
Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of
Utility.” Journal of Political Economy 63, no. 4
(1955): 309–21.
Hart, H. L. A. “Legal Responsibility and Excuses.”
Chap. 2 in Punishment and Responsibility.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975.
Hart, H. L. A. Punishment and Responsibility.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975.
Hong Kong SAR Government. Disability
Discrimination Ordinance. CAP 487.
Accessed July 9, 2017. https://www.
elegislation.gov.hk/hk/cap487!en?xpid=ID_
1438403263674_004
Hood, Roger. “Capital Punishment, Deterrence
and Crime Rates.” Seminar on the
Abolition of the Death Penalty, Kiev, 28–29
September 1996. Council of Europe
Parliamentary Assembly, Doc. AS/Jur (1996)
70.
Jeffrey, R. C. “Statistical Explanation vs. Statistical
Inference.” In Statistical Explanation and
Statistical Relevance, edited by W.C. Salmon,
19–28. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press,1971.
Kamm, Frances. Intricate Ethics. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2007.
Kansas v. Marsh. 548 U.S. 163 (2006), Scalia, J., con-
curring. 126 S.Ct. 2516, 2538; 165 L. Ed 429,
456–7. https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/
pdf/04-1170P.ZC
Kaye, David. “The Paradox of the Gatecrasher
and Other Stories.” Arizona State Law
Journal 1979, no. 1 (1979): 101–9.
Li, Hon-Lam. “Contractualism and Moral
Problems.” Unpublished manuscript.
Li, Hon-Lam. “Contractualism and Punishment.”
Criminal Justice Ethics 34, no. 2 (2015):
177–209.
Li, Hon-Lam. “What We Owe to Terminally Ill
Patients: The Option of Physician-Assisted
Suicide.” Asian Bioethics Review 8, no. 3
(2016): 224–43.
Markman, Stephen J., and Paul G. Cassell.
“Protecting the Innocent: A Response to
Contractualism and the Death Penalty
181
Bedau-Radelet.” Stanford Law Review 41, no.
1 (1988): 121–60.
Marquis, Joshua. 2006. “The Innocent and the
Shammed.”New York Times, January 26. A23.
Mellor, D. H. “Probable Explanation.”
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 54, no. 3
(1976): 231–41.
Nagel, Thomas. The View from Nowhere. New York:
Oxford University Press. 1986.
Nagin, Daniel S. “Deterrence in the Twenty-First
Century.” Crime and Justice 42, no. 1 (2013):
199–263.
Parfit, Derek. “Justifiability to Each Person.” Ratio
16, no. 4 (2003): 368–90.
Radelet, Michael L., andHugoAdamBedau. “The
Execution of the Innocent.” Law
and Contemporary Problems 61, no. 4 (1998):
105–24.
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1971.
Rhee, Robert J. “Probability, Policy, and the
Problem of a Reference Class.” International
Journal of Evidence and Proof 11, no. 4 (2007):
286–91.
Risinger, D. Michael. “Innocents Convicted: An
Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful
Conviction Rate.” Journal of Criminal Law
and Criminology 97, no. 3 (2007): 761–805.
Roach, Kent. “Wrongful Convictions in Canada.”
University of Cincinnati Law Review 80, no. 4
(2013): 1465–526.
Robinson, Paul H., and John M. Darley. “Does
Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural
Science Investigation,” Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies 24: 2 (2004), 173–205.
Salmon, Wesley C. “Statistical Explanation.” In
Statistical Explanation and Statistical
Relevance, edited by C. Wesley Salmon, 29–
88. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press, 1971.
Scanlon, T. M. Being Realistic about Reasons.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Scanlon, T. M. “Contractualism and Justification.”
Paper presented at the Workshop on
Contractualism and Justification, Porto
Alegre, Brasil, March 25, 2014.
Scanlon, T. M. “Contractualism and
Utilitarianism.” In T. M. Scanlon, The
Difficulty of Tolerance, 124–50. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Scanlon, T. M. “Giving Desert its Due.”
Philosophical Explorations 16, no. 2 (2013):
1–16.
Scanlon, T. M. “Individual Morality and the
Morality of Institutions.” Filozofia I Drustvo
XXVII 27, no. 1 (2016): 3–19.
Scanlon, T. M. What We Owe to Each Other.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1998.
Shelby, Tommie. “Justice, Deviance and the Dark
Ghetto.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 35, no.
2 (2007): 126–60.
Steinbeck, John. Of Mice and Men. New York:
Covici Friede, 1937.
Sterne, Ricki, and Arne Sundberg. 2006. The
Trials of Darryl Hunt. HBO Documentary
Films.
Thompson-Cannino, Jennifer, and Ronald Cotton.
Picking Cotton: Our Memoir of Injustice and
Redemption. New York: St. Martin’s Press,
2009.
Tonry, Michael. “Sentencing in America, 1975–
2025.” Crime and Justice 42, no. 1 (2013):
141–98.
Unger, Peter. Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975.
Von Hirsch, Andrew, Anthony E. Bottoms,
Elizabeth Burney, and P.-O. Wikstrom.
Criminal Deterrence and Sentence Severity: An
Analysis of Recent Research. Portland, 1999.
Zaal, D. “Traffic Law Enforcement: A Review of
the Literature.” Monash University
Accident Research Centre—Report #531994.
http://www.monash.edu/muarc/research/
our-publications/muarc053
Zuckerman, A. A. S. The Principles of Criminal
Evidence. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1989.
Hon-Lam Li
182
